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Abstract:  We investigate a game in which there is a long-run player who has private
information about how long will the game last, who must precommit to an action, and
who faces a sequence of short-run players who get a noisy signal of that action.  We
might expect such a long-lived long-run player to behave as a Stackelberg leader since
most short-run players will eventually learn the true action.  However,  short-run
players know that a long-run player that has been in the game for a long time must
have chosen the Stackelberg action and may ignore the evidence from the signal.  If
so, the long-run player may have no reason to actually choose the Stackelberg action.
We show that if there is a chance that the long-run player chooses other action by
mistake, and the signal is sufficiently informative, this paradox can be resolved.
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1.  Introduction
Consider a computer firm that is opening a store.  The store will sell two types
of computers, IBM’s and Macintoshes.  There are a fixed number of consumers that
will purchase computers from the store.  Due to good market research, the firm knows
how many customers will wish to visit the store.  Different customers will put the
computers they buy to different uses; some will be better off with IBM’s and some
with Macintoshes.  Consumers will arrive at the store one at a time, and each will
explain to the salesperson what they wish to use the computer for.  The salesperson
will then determine whether the consumer should buy an IBM or a Macintosh.  There
are two types of sales people, and the firm must decide which type to employ.  For a
relatively low wage, it can hire an ignorant salesperson who will ignore what the
consumer says, and assign an IBM or Macintosh at random; for a higher wage it can
hire a knowledgeable salesperson who will assign the correct type of computer.
Because of the overhead in hiring a salesperson, the firm will hire one person, and
employ that person until demand is exhausted and the store closed.
Consumers must decide whether to buy one computer (for the office) or two
(one for the office and one for the home).  If they knew for sure that they would be
assigned the correct type of computer, they would prefer to buy two computers; if they
believe that they are being assigned a computer at random, they wish to buy only a
computer for the office.  Unlike the firm, the consumers do not know the size of the
market, but they do share common probabilistic beliefs about how large it is.
However, they observe a noisy signal of how satisfied previous customers of the store
are.
The firm would rather pay extra for the knowledgeable salesperson if the
consumer will buy two computers instead of one.2
If the market size is relatively small, the firm has little reason to employ the
knowledgeable salesperson: consumers will acquire little information about the
salesperson, and will decide whether to buy one or two computers based upon their
prior beliefs about whether the salesperson is knowledgeable or not.  The firm should
simply save the extra wage.  If the market size is relatively large, we would expect the
firm to hire the knowledgeable salesperson since most of the arriving consumers will
have learned from the experience of their predecessors whether the salesperson is
most likely knowledgeable or not.  This suggests that the equilibrium should be
characterized by a critical market size: all smaller sizes hire the ignorant salesperson
and all larger sizes hire the knowledgeable salesperson.  This however leads to a
paradox: the consumers know the strategy of the firm, and so if the firm has been in
business long enough, the consumers will know that the firm must have hired the
knowledgeable salesperson.  Any evidence from the signal is disregarded, and
attributed to noise.  As a result, the long-lived firm has no reason to actually hire the
knowledgeable salesperson: once it has been in business long enough consumers will
believe that the knowledgeable salesperson was hired even if he was not.  So the long-
lived firm does best by hiring the ignorant salesperson.
The goal of this paper is to show how this paradox can be resolved if two
assumptions are satisfied.  First, there must be the possibility of the firm making a
mistake, that is hiring a person they think is knowledgeable who is in fact not.  In this
case no matter how long the firm has been in business consumers will never be certain
the firm has successfully hired the knowledgeable salesperson, and will never
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disregard the signal of how satisfied previous customers are.
4  Second, there are two
different sources of information about the behavior of the firm: the signal and the
length of time the firm has been in business.  The paradox will be resolved if the
signal is relatively more important.
Although we present our model in terms of a firm which must determine the
quality level of a new product, the issues raised in this paper apply more generally.
The relevant setting is one in which there is a long-run player who has private
information about how long will the game last, who must precommit to some action,
and who faces a sequence of short-run players who get a noisy signal of that action.  In
this setting, it is an equilibrium for the short-run players to ignore the signal and for
the long-run player to play the low cost action irrespective of how long will the game
last.  When we introduce the probability of making mistakes (“mandatory types”) this
ceases to be an equilibrium, because the signal always reveals information about the
presence of the mandatory types.  Moreover, it becomes possible to have an
equilibrium characterized by a critical market size (length of life of the long-run
player), as the short-run players do not ignore the signal even after it becomes
common knowledge that the market is larger than the critical size.
5
In order to build some intuition for our results, note that the stage game played
by the firm and the consumers has a prisoner’s dilemma structure.  In a one-shot
situation, the only equilibrium would be for the firm to produce low quality and for
                                                
4A similar point is made in Allen and Faulhaber [1988]: they argue in a two-period model that in order
for consumers to pay attention to past experience, it is necessary to have some noise in the decision
process of the firm.
5We will show that when the size of the market is common knowledge from the beginning of the game,
there must be a range over which the long-run player mixes:  intuitively, if the long-run player is
thought to be using the low cost action, the gain to using the high-cost action is larger than if he is
thought to be using the high cost action.  This is because the “low cost” signal is much less likely in the
former case.  Consequently, there is a range where whichever action the long-run player is using he4
the consumer to be mean.  If the firm is allowed to precommit, however, it will
precommit to the high quality in order to convince the consumer to be nice.  This
possibility is lost if the consumer only gets a noisy signal of the action played by the
firm: in a pure strategy equilibrium, the consumer should ignore the value of the
signal.  But this distroys the incentive for the firm to produce high quality.  In this
sense, the paradox we identify is similar to the one described by Bagwell [1995]: in a
two-period, two-player game where the action of the first player is communicated to
the second player with noise, a pure equilibrium strategy of the sequential game is a
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game.  In other words, with noise, the
first mover advantage is lost.  Our setup, however, is different from Bagwell’s: we
consider a dynamic game in which the noise goes to zero as time goes on.  More
importantly, our focus is not the paradox in itself but a proposed solution.
6
Since the solution we propose relies on private information, we can relate our
work to the literature on reputation and in particular to the model studied by Diamond
[1989].  While in our model the length of the game does not depend on the action
chosen by the long-run player, in Diamond’s model the length of the game depends
only on the behavior of the long-run player.  (In the Diamond model, there is no
precommitment, however.)  Unlike the Diamond model, in our setting, reputation can
increase or decrease over time, while in the Diamond setting, once a bad signal is
received the game is over.
In a context in which the tenure of a firm is determined by how profitable it is
in a particular market, the Diamond story is more applicable.  Where the tenure of the
firm is determined instead by the size of the market, as in the computer story above, or
                                                                                                                                           
prefers to use the other, and in equilibrium he must mix.5
by other exogenous factors, such as the health of the proprietor, opportunities in other
markets, and so forth, the model set forth here is more appropriate.
With the exception of Diamond’s [1989] model and related models such as
that of Martinelli [1996], traditional reputational models
7 have focused on how the
possibility of committed types allows uncommitted firms to reap the benefits of
precommitment.  Typically, in equilibrium, the long-run player initially plays the
precommitment strategy, and late in the game falls back on the low cost strategy.  In
the early rounds, the short-run player therefore plays as a Stackelberg follower.  This
focus on the final rounds of play seems misplaced from a practical point of view.
Here we eliminate cheating in the final rounds by forcing firms to precommit, and
focus instead on the fact that in the early rounds short-lived firms will follow the low
cost strategy.  If the probability of this is viewed as sufficiently high by the consumers,
they will not play as Stackelberg followers, and the long-lived firms must make a
costly investment in reputation in order to enjoy its benefits later in the game.  Such a
description of play seems much closer to what happens in many markets, as firms
must actually weigh the costs of building a reputation against its benefits.
2.  The Model
We first describe the stage game.  The long-run player, player 1, must choose
an action a1 of either high cost c  or low cost c where cc > .  The short-run player,
player 2, must choose an action a2  of either being nice N or mean M.  The utility of
player 1 is ua a 12 1 () -, where uN uM 11 () () > .  More strongly, we assume that
uN c uM c 11 () () -> -, so that it is worth precommitting to the high cost action if
                                                                                                                                           
6We leave for later a discussion of another solution proposed by van Damme and Hurkens [1994].6
doing so induces the short-run player to be nice rather than mean.  It is useful to define
the ratio between the cost difference between the long-run player’s two actions, and










Under our assumptions 01 1 << k .
The preferences of the short-run player are characterized by a number
10 2 >> k .  If a1 is the probability that the long-run player uses the high cost action,
then the short-run player will be willing to be nice if a a 11 2 1 /( ) -³ k  and is
indifferent between nice and mean if this holds with exact equality.  (He will wish to
be mean if the inequality is reversed.)
The dynamic game takes place in continuous time.  There is a continuum of
short-run players who arrive sequentially, one at a time.  The mass of short-run
players, which is the same as the length of life of the long-run player, is denoted by
T Î¥ (, ) 0 .  The long-run player knows this.  The short-run players have a common
knowledge prior over these times given by a cumulative distribution over the positive
reals F  with corresponding continuous density f.   We will always assume that f is
bounded above.   If f is unbounded at the origin, our results are unchanged but this
case adds additional complications to the analysis.
Some of our results depend on restricting how rapidly the probability of T
declines as T ®¥.  Specifically, we say that the probability of T declines slowly if
sup ( ) / ( ( )) ft Ft 1 -< ¥ .  It may easily be checked that this assumption is satisfied for
relatively thick tailed distributions such as the Pareto and exponential, and fails for
                                                                                                                                           
7For example, Kreps and Wilson [1982], Milgrom and Roberts [1982] and Fudenberg and Levine7
thinner tailed distributions such as the truncated normal and the chi-squared.
Long-run players are infinitely patient.  Our results, of course, still hold if they
discount the future at a very small rate.  They must choose a fixed value of a1 to be
applied to all short-run players.  This may be contingent on T.  Independently of T,
long-run players may be one of three types.  The first two types are referred to as
mandatory types: the first type plays c  no matter what; the second type plays c no
matter what.  The third type is called the optional type and may choose which strategy
to play.  The probability of the first two types are denoted by m() c and m() c,
respectively.  A (pure) strategy s 1 for the (optional) long-run player is simply a
measurable map from T to {,} cc.
8
Given the long-run players choice of a1 a scalar signal ht  observed by both
players is generated.  For example, this might be a cumulative measure of the
favorable publicity the product has received over time.  This signal follows a Wiener
process with drift ma () 1 and fixed instantaneous variance v.
9 The drift may be viewed
as the rate at which publicity accumulates, while the random motion of the process
reflects the fact that publicity is an imperfect measure of product quality.  The
assumption that the instantaneous variance v is independent of the action simplifies
computations.
According to this model the unconditional cumulative distribution of ht  given
a1 is F(( ( )) / ) ht tm a tv - 1  where F is the standard normal distribution.  We will
                                                                                                                                           
[1989].
8With mandatory types, the restriction to pure strategies plays no role beyond the simplification of
notation.  Without mandatory types, we cannot disregard the possibility of mixed strategy equilibria
(see Section 5).
9This is the continuous time limit of a discrete process h h e tt t ma t =+ + - 11 () D , where Dt  is the length
of a period, and e t  are (not necessarily normal) random variables with mean zero and variance vt D.8
use f  to denote the standard normal density.    For convenience we define mm c =()
and mm c =() .  We assume (without loss of generality) that mm >.  This corresponds
to the convention that ht  measures favorable (as opposed to unfavorable) publicity.
10
A strategy profile for the short-run players is then a measurable map from (, ) t t h  to
probability distributions over { , } N M .
The beliefs of the short-run player may be represented by the posterior odds
ratio between the probability of the long-run player playing c  to his probability of
playing c.  We denote this by g t .  Let  Ft() s 1 denote the fraction of the original
population of player 1´s who are playing c  at time t, and let F t() s 1 be the
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The equilibrium thus defined is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium because at any
stage of the game strategies are optimal given the beliefs, and the beliefs are obtained
from equilibrium strategies and the observed signal using Bayes’ rule.
                                                
10Note that we do not require m < 0 ; it may simply be that if the product is of low quality it receives9
We say that the strategy s 1 has the cutoff property if there is a  ~ T  such that
s 1() Tc =  for TT < ~  and s 1() Tc =  for TT > ~ .  We say the equilibrium has the
cutoff property if the player 1 strategy has the cutoff property.
3.  Existence of Cutoff Equilibria
Our main results are
Theorem 1: Suppose that  ft ()>0  for all t > 0
11 and that m m () ,() cc > 0 .  Then, there
exists D  such that if () / mm v -³ D  an equilibrium with the cutoff property exists.
 Theorem 2: Suppose that  ft ()>0  for all t > 0
 and that m m () ,() cc > 0 .  If, in
addition, the probability of T declines slowly, there exists D  such that if
() / mm v -³ D  all equilibria have the cutoff property.
The first theorem states that, if the signal is sufficiently informative about the action
chosen by the long-run player, there is an equilibrium in which they will choose the
low cost action if their time horizon is short and the high cost action if their time
horizon is long.  The second theorem gives us a sufficient condition for that to be the
only type of equilibrium.
The idea of the proofs is that a long-run player who expect to be in the game
long enough to reap the benefits of building a reputation will choose to do so by
committing to the high cost action.  The situation is complicated by the fact that, if
there were no mandatory types, short-run players would become convinced at some
                                                                                                                                           
favorable publicity, but at a lower rate than if it was of high quality.10
point that they are facing a long-run player committed to the high cost action, thus
disregarding completely the value of the signal.  But that would destroy the
reputational incentive to choose the high cost action in the first place.  We avoid this
paradox using m() c> 0 .  Then, short-run players can never be certain they are facing a
long-run player committed to the high cost action, so they will never disregard
completely the value of the signal.  Moreover, if the probability of T declines slowly,
then the short-run players do not suddenly become “too confident” that the long-run
player is playing the high cost leading them to disregard a bad realization of the value
of the signal.
We proceed via several lemmas, proven in the Appendix.  First we need some
additional notation.  Let h s t() 1, given implicitly by g s h s tt k (,() ) 112 = , be the value
of the signal that makes the short-run player at time t indifferent between being nice
and being mean if the long-run player is expected to play according to the strategy s 1.
Define zt m t v t t ()(() ) sh s 11 =-  and zt m t v t t ()(() ) sh s 11 =- .  These represent
cutoff values for the short-run player playing the nice action when the signal is
normalized to be standard normal conditional on the long-run player actually playing
the low cost (zt() s 1) and high cost (zt() s 1) actions.  From these cutoffs, we may







¥ I  to be the probability that g s h tt (,) 1  is greater or equal
to k2  (that is, that the nice action is chosen) conditional on the long-run player playing






¥ I  to be the corresponding number conditional
on the high cost action.
                                                                                                                                           
11With some extra work, it can be shown that  ft ()>0 need only hold for sufficiently small t (the same
applies to Theorem 2).11
To determine the strategy used by the long-run player, we will compute the
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Given the equilibrium strategy of the short-run players and the definitions of  pt() s 1
and  p
t() s 1, this is equivalent to




()() () () ()() () () ss 11 1 1 0 11 1 1 0 -+- - -+- II 38 49 .
We may divide through by uN uM 11 () () - and find a “normalized” gain from using
the high cost action which simplifies to
GT p p k d t t t
T
(, ) () () ss s 11 1 1 0 =- - I 4 9 .
In the special case where s 1 is a cutoff strategy with cutoff  ~ T  we abbreviate this to
GTT ( ~ ,) .
In equilibrium, therefore, a long-run player who lives T must play the high cost
strategy whenever GT (, ) s 1  is strictly positive and the low cost strategy whenever it
is strictly negative.  Note that GT (, ) s 1  is continuous in T.  It follows that the long-
run players will use a cutoff strategy if, as a function of T, GT (, ) s 1  has a unique zero
and is negative for sufficiently small values of T.  The first Lemma gives conditions
for this to be the case.





tt () () s s
1 1 > , lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
® -=
0 11 0 ss 49 , and12
lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
®¥ -= ss 11 1 4 9 , then the long-run player is using a strategy with the cutoff
property.
The second Lemma shows that very early in the game the action of the short-
run player is unrelated to the action chosen by the long-run player.  It also shows that
late in the game the short-run player plays the nice action (with very high probability)
if the long-run player has chosen the high cost action.  This is the first of the sufficient
conditions for the long-run player to use a cutoff strategy.
Lemma 2: If mm () , () cc > 0 , then lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
® -=
0 11 0 ss 49  and
lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
®¥ -= ss 11 1 4 9  uniformly in the strategy s 1 of the long-run player.  If, in
addition, s 1 is a cutoff strategy with cutoff  ~ T then  pp t t () ,() ss 11  are continuous in
t, ~ T  for t>0.
Our third Lemma gives a sufficient condition for the probability of being nice
to increase more rapidly at every moment in time if the high cost action is taken than
if the low cost action is taken.  This is the other sufficient condition needed to
establish that the long-run player is using a cutoff strategy.
Lemma 3: Suppose that
() /
() ()
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1 1 > .  In


























tt () () s s
1 1 > .
The hypothesis of Lemma 3 incorporates the idea that the probability of nice
and mean types must be positive (since otherwise the denominator on the RHS is zero
and the condition cannot hold).  It measures the relative importance of two sources of
information about the long-run player: the rate at which his action is revealed via the
signal (the LHS) and the probability that the game continues to be played.  The latter
is represented by the ratio of the density of T to the probability of a larger value of T.
If this ratio is large, then it is unlikely the game will continue much longer, and the
fact that it does continue is therefore very informative.  If it is too informative relative
to the signal, then the short-run players may conclude (if the long-run player is using a
cutoff strategy, for example) that despite bad realizations of the signal the long-run
player is likely to be playing the high cost action.  This then leads to the paradox
described in the introduction, since the long-run player then has no incentive to
actually use the high cost action, as the short-run player will be nice anyway.
The final Lemma shows that increasing the informativeness of the signal
increases the utility from the costly action.
Lemma 4: Holding fixed kk 12 ,  and F, if () / ( ) / ¢ - ¢¢ >- mm v m m v  then for any
s 1,T   ¢ > GT G T (, ) (, ) ss 11 .
We now prove the Theorems at the start of the section.14
Proof of Theorem 1: To show that a cutoff equilibrium actually exists, we must show
that there is a solution to GTT (,) = 0 and that when the long-run player uses the





tt () () s s
1 1 > , so that we may apply Lemma
1.
If we can show that GTT ( , ) is negative for T sufficiently small, positive for T
sufficiently large and continuous in between, existence of a solution to GTT (,) = 0
will follow from the intermediate value theorem.
Suppose, then, that the long-run player is using a cutoff strategy  ~ s 1 with cutoff
~ T .  From Lemma 2 it follows that  pp t t ( ~ )( ~ ) ss 11 -  is continuous in tT ,~ for t > 0,
and that as t ®¥ pp t t ( ~ )( ~ ) ss 11 1 -®  and  pp t t ( ~ )( ~ ) ss 11 0 -®  uniformly in  ~ T .
Since pp t t ( ~ )( ~ ) ss 11 -  is also bounded between -1 and 1, we conclude that GTT (,)
is continuous in T, and, since 01 1 << k , that for some e > 0 and all 0<< t e
Gtt (,)<0, and for some  ~ T <¥ GTT ( ~ , ~ ) > 0.  This implies that GTT (,) = 0 has a
solution.





tt () () s s
1 1 > .  In the case of a probability of T
that declines slowly, this follows immediately from Lemma 3.  In the general case, we
may let T  be the largest (sup) value of T such that the hypothesis of Lemma 3 holds.
Obviously, as () / mm v -  goes to infinity, so does T .  On the other hand, from the
argument above, for any value of () / mm v -  there is a largest T  solving
GTT (,) = 0.  By Lemma 4, we see that as () / mm v -  increases, T cannot increase,15
and indeed, must actually decrease.  It follows that for some D  and all
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tt () () s s
1 1 > , so this holds for all t as desired.
æ
Proof of Theorem 2: The fact that all equilibria have the cutoff property when the
probability of T declines slowly for all sufficiently large () / mm v -  follows from





tt () () s s
1 1 > .  Combining this
with Lemma 2 gives the hypothesis of Lemma 1 and the desired conclusion.
æ
Theorem 1 does not preclude the existence of non-cutoff equilibria, that is,
equilibria in which GT T ( $ () ,) s 1  has several zeros.  To make sure that the equilibrium
strategy of the long-run player has the cutoff property we need the restriction on the
tails of the distribution, incorporated in Theorem 2.16
4.  Comparative Statics
We turn in this section to the comparative statics of the cutoff point.  This is
determined by the way in which G  changes when the parameters are modified.  The
following Lemma follows immediately from the definition of G :
Lemma 5: Holding fixed mmvk ,, , 2  and F, if  ¢ < kk 11  then for any s 1,T
¢ > GT G T (, ) (, ) ss 11 .
Combining this with Lemma 4, we see that G  is increasing in the informativeness of
the signal and decreasing in the ratio between the gain from using the low cost action
to the benefit from the short-run player being nice.  The implications of this for




As G  increases, both the best and worst possible equilibrium cutoff points shift to the
right.  Generally speaking, then, we see that the range of equilibria shifts toward
shorter cutoffs as the informativeness of the signal increase or the ratio between the17
gain from using the low cost action to the benefit from the short-run player being nice
decreases.  An equilibrium cutoff point in the middle, however, could move in the
opposite direction, thus yielding perverse results in terms of comparative statics.
5. The Role of Private Information
In our model there are two sources of private information.  On the one hand
short-run players do not know whether the long run player is a normal type or a
mandatory type; on the other hand they do not know for how long will the long-run
player will stay in the market.  We discuss the two assumptions separately in this
section.
Due to the paradox described in the introduction, the existence of mandatory
types is crucial for the existence of cutoff equilibrium.  Without mandatory types, any
equilibrium in which the long-run player chooses the high cost action for some T must
involve either randomizing behavior or alternating intervals in T of the high cost and
low cost action.  Moreover, we cannot disregard a pure strategy equilibrium in which
the long-run player chooses the low cost action in spite of T, and all short-run players
choose to be mean in spite of the signal.
It is instructive to compare our work with that of van Damme and Hurkens
[1994].  They use a setup similar to Bagwell’s [1995], that is, a two-person sequential
decision model without mandatory types.  They argue that the most plausible
equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium that generates an outcome close to the
Stackelberg outcome and converges to the Stackelberg outcome as the noise level
goes to zero.  Van Damme and Hurkens use an equilibrium refinement that implies18
that, for small noise, players coordinate expectations on the equilibrium involving the
least amount of randomization from player 1 needed to keep player 2 from
disregarding the signal.  We avoid the use of mixed strategies by introducing some
exogenous probability of making mistakes, and give a condition under which all
equilibria exhibit the cutoff property.  We might add that the use of an equilibrium
refinement that involves some sort of coordination of expectations is at least
problematic in our setup, with a continuum of short-run players.
In the absence of private information about the length of stay of the long-run
player in the market, the signal becomes the only source of information about the
behavior of the firm.  It might be tempting to think that, as the signal improves over
time, there must be a cutoff equilibrium in the model thus modified.  Lemma 6 gives
us a sufficient condition for this not to be the case:
Lemma 6: In the modified game (with complete information about T), if
m m () () cc £< 12, there is no cutoff equilibrium.
(The proof is in the Appendix).  Lemma 6 holds regardless of how informative the
signal is.
The idea of the proof is the following.  Regardless of the action actually
chosen by the long-run player, the gain from using the high cost action is negative for
T  sufficiently small but positive for T  sufficiently large.  However, the gain from
using the high cost action is larger when the short-run players expect a normal long-
run player to use the low cost rather than the high cost action.  The reason for this is
that when the low cost action is thought to be used by the normal type, it becomes
easy to persuade the short-run players that they are facing the mandatory type playing19
the high cost.  Hence, there is an interval (, ) ¢¢ ¢ TT  in which the gain from using the
high cost action is positive if the short-run players expect a normal long-run player to
use the low cost action but negative if they expect him to use the high cost action.  For
TT T Î ¢¢ ¢ (, ) , equilibrium behavior involves the long-run playerEMBED  using a
mixed strategy.
12
With uncertain length of life, the effect described above is offset by the fact
that non-mandatory types are dropping out over time.  In terms of our original model,
we can think of the short-run players as learning “too fast” if they know from the
beginning of the game that TT > ’ .
6.  Extensions
It is interesting to ask whether the results in this paper can be extended to a
more general class of games.  Note that Lemmas 2 and 3 hold for any strategy of the
long-run player (and hence, independently of any assumption about the payoffs to the
long-run player).  In other words, take any game of precommitment with the long-run,
short-run player structure described in the paper, with a similar noise process, with
mandatory types and private information about T.  Let  cc , ;@  be the two possible
actions of the long-run player.  Then the difference between the probability that the
short-run player who plays  a best response at t to c  when the long-run player played
c  and that he plays a best response to c  when the long-run player played c  goes to
zero when t  is close to zero and goes to one as t goes to infinite.  Moreover, under our
fat-tails condition on beliefs about T, this difference is strictly increasing.
                                                
12If the condition stated in the Lemma is not met, there might be a cutoff equilibrium.  Intuitively, when20
The implications of this result for the equilibrium strategy of the long-run
player (Lemma 1) depend on the payoffs to the long-run player.  Our results hold in
any game with a prisoner’s dilemma payoff structure, and in which the gain for the
long-run player from adopting his one-shot equilibrium action is independent of the
action of the short-run player.  Even without private information about T, however, we
can prove that any equilibrium strategy s 1 for the long-run player satisfies the
Stackelberg property: there is a  ~ T  such that s 1() Tc =  for TT > ~ .  This follows from
the fact that  pt() s 1 goes to one and  p
t() s 1 goes to zero as t goes to infinite.  Note
that the Stackelberg property is weaker than the cutoff property.
We want to conclude by discussing an extension of our model to the issue of
international direct investment.  In our view, the most important decision made by
sovereign countries with respect to international direct investment is the choice of
institutions for the treatment of foreign investors.  Such institutions include legal
arrangements to discriminate against foreign investors in favor of domestic investors,
legal restrictions on capital flows, and so forth.
To simplify matters, suppose there are only two sets of institutions for the
treatment of foreign investors: “good institutions,” corresponding to the high cost
action in the model, and “bad institutions,” corresponding to the low cost action in the
model.  A government has to choose the set of institutions having some private
information about the expected length of time T the institutions will be in place (say,
until the next big political change, or until opportunities for foreign direct investment
are exhausted).  While investors do not get to observe directly the character of the
                                                                                                                                           
the long run player is thought to be using the high cost action, it might not pay him to deviate because
short run players are easily persuaded that they are facing a mandatory type playing the low  cost.21
institutions chosen by the government, they can observe the frequency of events such
as restrictions on repatriation of funds, the difficulty in establishing joint ventures,
legal obstacles to investment and so forth.  To simplify matters, suppose there are only
two types of investors: those with good alternative investment opportunities and those
without them.  The nice action of the short-run player corresponds to both types of
investors investing; the mean action of the short-run player corresponds to only those
with poor outside opportunities investing.
Under those circumstances, our model predicts that a country should suffer
from a period of low investment before all foreign investors become convinced that it
is worth to invest money in it.  Moreover, this length of time varies randomly,
depending on whether the country is lucky or unlucky with the random outcome of the
signal.
This argument has important implications for the consequences of political
stability and information flows on direct investment.  In particular, it points out that it
may well be necessary for a country to suffer through a period of low investment even
if the country has set up a favorable institutional framework for the treatment of
foreign investors.  This focus is different than the usual discussion of reputational
models of international lending, such as Eaton and Gersovitz [1981] and Bulow and
Rogoff [1989].  In that discussion the issue addressed is whether reputation alone is
sufficient to sustain foreign borrowing when the country has the option of defaulting
in every period.  These models do not suggest that there should be a delay in receiving
funds from abroad, although Eaton [1990] does discuss the possibility that the interest
rate paid may be higher initially than later on.  Nor does any of the discussion indicate
the possibility that the availability of funds may fluctuate randomly depending upon22
fortunate or unfortunate publicity.
13 The point is that the model here provides an
integrated account making relatively specific predictions of how information affects
the rate of investment.
                                                
13Grossman and Van Huyck [1988] discuss the related issue of distinguishing justifiable from
unjustifiable default.23
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Appendix
From the definitions of h s t() 1 and g s h tt t ()  we can compute an explicit
expression for zt() s 1 and zt() s 1.  Because we will continually make use of this































































We now prove the Lemmas in the text.





tt () () s s
1 1 > , lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
® -=
0 11 0 ss 49 , and
lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
®¥ -= ss 11 1 4 9 , then the long-run player is using a strategy with the cutoff
property.
Proof:  Since lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
® -=
0 11 0 ss 49  for any strategy s 1 of the long-run player and
k1 0 > ,  GT (, ) s 1 0 ³ cannot hold for T close to 0.  That is, there cannot be an
equilibrium in which the long-run player chooses the high cost action for T arbitrarily
close to 0.
Now, suppose there is a  $ T  such that GT (, $ ) s 1 0 ³, so that the long-run player
may choose the high cost action for TT = $ .  Since lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp k
® -= <
0 11 1 0 ss 49 , and,25
by the statement of the Lemma,  pp t t () () ss 11 -  is strictly increasing, it has to be the
case that
ppk T T $ $ () () ss 11 1 -> .
But then, since  pp t t () () ss 11 -  is strictly increasing, it has to be the case that
ppkt T t t () () $ ss 11 1 -> >  for all  ,
which implies GT (, ) s 1 0 > for all TT > $ .  That is, if in equilibrium the long-run
player chooses the high cost action for some TT = $ , he will choose it for any TT > $ .
Finally, notice that, given that k1 1 < , lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
®¥ -= ss 11 1 4 9  and
d
dt
pp t t () () ss 11 0 -> 49 , there must be some ~ t  such that  ppk t t () () ss 11 1 0 -- >
for all tt > ~ .  Notice also that this expression is strictly increasing, so that
GT Gt (, ) (, ~ ) ss 11 -  grows unboundedly with T.  Since Gt (, ~ ) s 1  is bounded from
below by -+ 1 1 kt 16 ~ , it cannot be true that GT (, ) s 1 0 £  for T arbitrarily large.  That
is, there cannot be an equilibrium in which the long-run player chooses the low cost
action for T arbitrarily large.
æ
Lemma 2: If mm () , () cc > 0 , then lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
® -=
0 11 0 ss 49  and
lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
®¥ -= ss 11 1 4 9  uniformly in the strategy s 1 of the long-run player.  If, in
addition, s 1 is a cutoff strategy with cutoff  ~ T then  pp t t () ,() ss 11  are continuous in
t, ~ T  for t>0.26
Proof:  The first result, lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
® -=
0 11 0 ss 49 , follows directly from the fact that













-= I  and (from Lemma 0) zz
t
v
mm t t () () ss 11 =+- 38 ,
and indeed, does not require the hypothesis that mm () , () cc > 0 .  Notice that the rate of
convergence can be bounded independently of s 1, so that the convergence is uniform
as required.
For the second result, lim ( ) ( )
t t t pp
®¥ -= ss 11 1 4 9 , we begin with zt() s 1 from

























(independent of s 1), lim ( )
t
t z
®¥ =¥ s1 .  It follows that lim ( )
t t p
®¥ = s1 0.
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, lim ( )
t
t z
®¥ =- ¥ s1 .  It follows that lim ( )
t t p
®¥ = s1 1.  In both cases the
rate of convergence is bounded independently of s 1, so that convergence is uniform
as required.
Finally, turning to the case of a cutoff strategy  ~ s 1 by player 1
F
cF t c c F T F t t T
cF t t T
F
cF t c c F Tt T




() ( () ) () ()( ( ~ )( ) ) ~
() ( () ) ~
( ~)
() ( () ) () ()( ( ~ )) ~


























Both  FF t t ( ~ ), (~ ) ss 11  are continuous in tT ,~.  From the definitions it follows  that27
zz t t ( ~ ), (~ ) s s 11  are both continuous in tT ,~ for t > 0, and that  pp t t ( ~ )( ~ ) ss 11 -  is
continuous in tT ,~ for t > 0.
æ
Lemma 3: Suppose that
() /
() ()

































tt () () s s
1 1 > .  In


























tt () () s s
1 1 > .



















































t() s 1 and  pt() s 1 we compute
d pd tzd zd t
t tt () ( () ) () s f s s 11 1 =-
d pd tzd zd t t tt () ( () ) () sf s s 11 1 =- .
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 .





tt () () s s
1 1 >  as long
as the RHS of the previous expression is positive.  The first term  in the RHS is


























   have the same sign.
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1 1 > .
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Manipulating this expression and making use of the fact that 01 1 ££ a s T ()  we find
that the first condition in the Lemma is sufficient for the conclusion.
æ
Lemma 4: Holding fixed kk 12 ,  and F, if () / ( ) / ¢ - ¢¢ >- mm v m m v  then for any
s 1,T   ¢ > GT G T (, ) (, ) ss 11 .
Proof:   From the definition of G  it suffices to show that
¢ - ¢ >- ppp p t t t t () () () () ss s s 11 1 1 .
Recall that  pp t t () () ss 11 -  is simply the integral of a standard normal density
between z() s 1 and z() s 1.  Moreover, za b () s 1=- + , za b () s 1=+, where a is
positive, the sign of b is indeterminate, a is increasing in () / mm v -  and  b  is
decreasing in () / mm v - .  Since both increasing a and decreasing  b  increase the
integral of any symmetric single peaked density over the range [, ] -+ + ab ab  the
result follows.
æ30
Lemma 6: In the modified game (complete information about T), if
m m () () cc £< 12, there is no cutoff equilibrium.
Proof:  As in Section 3, we can find a “normalized” gain for the long-run player from
using the high cost action when s 1() Tc =  and a “normalized” gain for the long-run
player from using the high cost action when s 1() Tc = .  These are given, respectively,
by
GcT p c p c kd t t t
T
(,) () () =- - I 1 0 4 9 ,
GcT p c p c kd t t t
T
(, ) () () =- - I 1 0 4 9 ,
with
 
pc z d z pc z d z
pc z d z pc z d z
t zc t zc
t zc t zc
t t
t t
() () , () () ,





















































































































Following the reasoning in Lemma 2, we can establish that GcT GcT (,) , (,)  are
continuous in T and are negative for small enough T and positive for large enough T.
We want to prove that, under the conditions of the Lemma, GcT GcT (,) (,) << 0  for31
TT T Î ¢¢ ¢ , 16  for some  ¢¢ ¢ TT ,  so that for TT T Î ¢¢ ¢ , 16  there is no equilibrium in pure
strategies.  Note that GcT GcT (,) (,) <  for all T  (and, in fact, GcT GcT (, ) (, ) -  is























which holds under the conditions in the Lemma (recall that 01 2 << k ).  This gives the
desired result.
æ